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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A FUNDA-
MENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION WITH LIFE OR
DEATH CONSEQUENCES
I. INTRODUCTION
You have been charged with first-degree murder. Somehow you
survived the trial, although it was without a doubt the most trying
experience of your life. You were found guilty, but the jury could not
come to a unanimous decision regarding a sentence, so you managed
to walk away with your life. Clearly the remainder of your life will be
spent behind bars, but you are grateful to know you will not be exe-
cuted. At least the scariest part of the whole ordeal is over.
Then you get a visit from your lawyer, who tells you he thinks you
have a good chance on appeal. Although you dread having to go
through the nightmare of another trial, this is the best news you have
heard in months. You begin to feel optimistic, maybe you can beat this
thing after all. The only problem is if you are found guilty again the
jury will reconsider the death penalty, and this time you could end up
sentenced to die. Your lawyer tells you to take a few days to think it
over, but he must notify the court of your appeal soon.
You are facing the toughest decision of your entire life. Do you
take a chance on appeal and risk death, or do you take your life sen-
tence and try to forget what could have been? Can you really roll the
dice and gamble your life away?
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states "no
person shall... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeop-
ardy of life or limb."1 Although on the surface this language appears
clear, interpreting its meaning has caused problems on many levels.2
In Ex Parte Lange, Justice Miller stated, "If there is anything settled in
the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be
twice lawfully punished for the same offence."'3 Yet more than a cen-
tury later, the ins and outs of this constitutional protection are still
being debated.
In January 2003, yet another issue arose in the ongoing saga of
double jeopardy analysis. The United States Supreme Court dealt with
a very narrow and specific set of facts, involving procedural questions
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32 (1978).
3. Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873).
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the Court had never answered in the history of double jeopardy case
law. What is the effect of a deadlocked jury in a sentencing hearing
for the application of the death penalty on the termination of jeopardy?
This comment will explore this issue as presented in Sattazahn v.
Pennsylvania4 , and analyze not only the arguments made in both the
majority and dissenting opinions, but other considerations which arise
when deciding if double jeopardy protections should apply. Also con-
sidered in the comment is the effect of the Sattazahn decision on
future criminal defendants. What consequences will this decision
have for the death row defendant when trying to decide whether to
appeal his possibly erroneous conviction?
In considering these issues, this comment will show why defend-
ants like David Sattazahn deserve the protections of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause; the protections guaranteed them by the Constitution of
the United States of America. Without protections for these individu-
als, the various principles behind the Double Jeopardy Clause are
defeated, capital sentencing is denied the extraordinary deliberation it
deserves, and the rights to both a fair trial and an appeal are destroyed.
Part II outlines the background of the case law on the Double
Jeopardy Clause and its protections. Part III introduces the reader to
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, providing background in both fact and pro-
cedure. Part IV outlines the arguments for double jeopardy protections
in this particular type of case and is broken into five subparts, each
covering different aspects of the overall theme. Subsection A analyzes
the arguments made by both the majority and the dissent in the Sat-
tazahn decision on the clearest factor that separates them: Is an acquit-
tal required for double jeopardy protections to apply? Subsection B
discusses how the rationales for the Double Jeopardy Clause show how
its protections should and do apply to final judgments that do not
amount to acquittals. In subsection C, the rationales previously out-
lined are balanced with society's interest in putting a guilty man to
death. Subsection D considers the unique nature of capital sentenc-
ing, and how its severity and finality call for more careful considera-
tion of issues such as double jeopardy protection. The consequences
of the Sattazahn decision are considered in subsection E, specifically
how it forces future criminal defendants into a "choice" between their
right to appeal and their entitlement to life. Finally, Part V concludes
the comment.
4. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003).
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II. HISTORY OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY ANALYSIS
Since the late 1800s, the Supreme Court has struggled to define
and clarify both the reaches and limitations of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. There are several key cases which must be cited when discuss-
ing the history of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Included in those
cases, and discussed chronologically below, are United States v. Ball 5,
Stroud v. United States 6, North Carolina vs. Pearce7 , Bullington v. Mis-
souri8 , Arizona v. Rumsey 9, and Poland v. Arizona'. Each of these
cases represents a new step or novel idea within the ongoing analysis
of double jeopardy protections.
One of the earliest decisions to address the issue of a court's abil-
ity to retry defendants whose convictions had been overturned came in
1896 with United States v. Ball." In that case, three defendants, two of
whom had been convicted and one who had been acquitted of murder,
were re-tried and found guilty after their indictments had been
quashed on remand. 12 The Court held that "a verdict of acquittal,
although not followed by any judgment, is a bar to a subsequent prose-
cution for the same offense," and therefore found double jeopardy ter-
minate the case for the defendant who was originally acquitted. 13 The
Court also stated, however, "that a defendant, who procures a judg-
ment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried
anew upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the
same offense of which he had been convicted."'1 4 Therefore, no bar
exists to the retrial of those defendants convicted in their first trial.
15
The next significant case in double jeopardy case law came in
1919 with Stroud v. United States.'6 The government tried the defen-
dant on three different occasions for the crime of murder in the first
degree. He was first sentenced to hang, then charged without capital
punishment, and finally found guilty as charged with no recommenda-
tion dispensing with capital punishment. 17 Defendant claimed that
5. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
6. Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919).
7. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
8. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
9. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984).
10. Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
11. Ball, 163 U.S. at 662.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 671.
14. Id. at 672.
15. Ball, 163 U.S. 662.
16. Stroud,251 U.S. 15.
17. Id. at 16-17.
11920041
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the last trial violated the protections of the Fifth Amendment, but after
a very short discussion the Supreme Court disposed of the argument
and found defendant not to be placed in second jeopardy."'
Nearly a half-century later, the Supreme Court gave birth to what
has come to be known as the "clean slate" rule.' 9 In North Carolina v.
Pearce, two separate defendants brought Double Jeopardy, Due Pro-
cess, and Equal Protection claims after they were sentenced to longer
prison terms on retrial.2 0 The Supreme Court held "that neither the
double jeopardy provision nor the Equal Protection Clause imposes an
absolute bar to a more severe sentence upon reconviction."' Provided
that the defendant was fully "credited '22 with time already served, no
bar existed to the imposition of a longer or more severe prison sen-
tence upon retrial.23 The basis for this decision "rest[ed] ultimately
upon the premise that the original conviction ha[d]. . .been wholly
nullified and the slate wiped clean. 2 4
Perhaps one of the more important double jeopardy cases for the
death penalty came in Bullington v. Missouri, decided in 1981, which
focused on the applicability of double jeopardy to sentencing. 5 In
Bullington, the defendant had been convicted of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment.26 He was later granted a new trial after the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Duren v. Missouri27, rul-
ing that Missouri's automatic exemption of women from jury service
was unconstitutional. 2 The government tried to seek the death pen-
alty on retrial, and the Missouri Supreme Court held that there was no
bar to them doing so. 29 The Supreme Court reversed and agreed with
the dissent in its statement that "the jury ha[d] already acquitted the
defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence. 30
Bullington focused its analysis on the "very different situation"'3 1
in which there is a bifurcated proceeding, where sentencing is decided
18. Id. at 17-18.
19. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 723.
22. Id. at 719.
23. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711.
24. Id. at 721.
25. Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
26. Id.
27. See generally Duren v. Missouri, 
__
28. Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 445.
31. Id. at 446.
120 [Vol. 27:117
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separately in a proceeding with the "hallmarks of a trial on guilt or
innocence. 32 Particular sentencing procedures, such as the separate
proceeding where the prosecution is required to prove additional facts
to justify a particular sentence, and the sentencer's discretion, deter-
mined by the standards enacted to guide the judge or jury, become of
vital importance in deciding whether Pearce applies. 33 In making this
decision, Justice Blackmun reinstated a crucial exception to the rule
stated in Pearce, which was first explained in Burks v. United States.34
That exception states, "A defendant may not be retried if he obtains a
reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to convict. '' 35 Therefore, "the 'clean slate' rationale... is inappli-
cable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the
prosecution has not proved its case. ' 36 The majority in Bullington
reached the conclusion that "because the sentencing proceeding... was
like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection
afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also
is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial."37
In sum, once a verdict is reached and a defendant acquitted on the
question of guilt or innocence, that verdict is without question final.38
The Court continued with this line of thinking just a few years
later in Arizona v. Rumsey.39 Rumsey was convicted of both armed
robbery and murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment.40 The state
supreme court remanded the case to the trial court on appeal and
Rumsey was resentenced to death. 41 It was later found that this vio-
lated the Double Jeopardy Clause and Rumsey's sentence was again set
at life imprisonment. 42 The State, however, petitioned for a writ of
certiorari, and the Court decided that the defendant's initial life sen-
tence constituted an "acquittal" of the death penalty, therefore prevent-
ing the resentence of death.43 The Court specifically stated in this
decision that although Rumsey had requested that the Court overrule
32. Id. at 439.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 442; see generally Pearce, 395 U.S. 711; Burks v. United States,
35. Bullington, 451 U.S. at 442.
36. Id. at 443.
37. Id. at 446.
38. Id. at 445.
39. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
20041
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Bullington, they refused to do so.44 Once again it was stressed that "an
acquittal on the merits by the sole decisionmaker in the proceeding is
final and bars retrial on the same charge."45
Finally, there was Poland v. Arizona, the last in a string of cases
distinguishing Bullington.46 In this case, two men were convicted of
first-degree murder and the sentencing judge gave them both the death
penalty. 47 After reversal by the Arizona Supreme Court, petitioners
were again convicted and sentenced to death.48 The Court rejected
petitioner's argument that "a capital sentencer's failure to find a partic-
ular aggravating circumstance alleged by the prosecution always con-
stitutes an 'acquittal' of that circumstance for double jeopardy
purposes. '49 Justice White reiterated that "Bullington indicated that
the proper inquiry is whether the sentencer or reviewing court has
'decided that the prosecution has not proved its case' that the death
penalty is appropriate."' 0 Here, the prosecution clearly had proven its
case, as the petitioners had been sentenced to the death penalty by the
initial sentencing judge.51
Just as the language of the Fifth Amendment is "deceptively
plain, '52 so too may be the history and case law outlining its applica-
tion. As the Sattazahn decision illustrate, many issues still remain
debatable and somewhat unresolved. 53 First of all, how do the consti-
tutional guarantees to a fair trial and the right to an appeal fit in? Even
more troublesome are the many problems that arise when the death
penalty is added to the mix, and the intricacies of this unique and final
sentence must also be considered. Should defendants be put in the
position to decide between an appeal and their lives?
III. DAVID ALLEN SATTAZAHN V. PENNSYLVANIA
On Sunday evening, April 12, 1987, two men hid in a wooded
area waiting to rob the manager of the Heidelberg Family Restaurant. 54
The two men were David Allen Sattazahn and his accomplice, Jeffrey
44. Id. at 212.
45. Id. at 211.
46. Poland, 476 U.S. 147; see generally Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
47. Poland, 476 U.S. 147.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 155.
51. Poland, 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
52. Crist, 437 U.S. at 32.
53. See Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 101.
54. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 103.
[Vol. 27:117
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Hammer.5 5 The man they waited to accost was Richard Boyer.56 It was
just about closing time, and both Sattazahn and Hammer were ready
with their guns drawn.5 7 As Boyer left the restaurant and walked
across the parking lot, both men attacked him and demanded the bank
deposit bag containing the entire day's money and receipts.5 8 Boyer
responded by tossing the bag towards the roof, to which Sattazahn and
Hammer responded with a command to retrieve it.5 9 Instead of follow-
ing that command, Boyer attempted to escape. 60 As he was running
away, Sattazahn and Hammer both fired shots and Boyer fell dead.61
The two men then retrieved the bank deposit bag and fled.62
Sattazahn was prosecuted by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
and found guilty of several charges, one of which was first-degree mur-
der.63 In the sentencing phase, the jury deadlocked after three and a
half hours of deliberation, and Sattazahn moved that the jury be dis-
charged.64 Pursuant to Pennsylvania law, the trial judge discharged
the jury and entered the required life sentence.
Sattazahn's conviction was overturned on appeal by the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court due to an error in the jury instructions by the
trial judge.66 On remand, Pennsylvania filed a notice of their intent to
seek the death penalty.67 Sattazahn attempted to prevent Pennsylvania
from seeking the death penalty on retrial but his motion was denied.68
The second trial resulted in another conviction for first-degree murder,
but this time Sattazahn was sentenced to death.69
On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed both
the conviction of first-degree murder and the death sentence on
retrial. 70 Relying on earlier decisions, the court concluded that seek-
ing the death penalty on retrial did not violate the Double Jeopardy
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 104.
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
20041
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Clause or the Due Process Clause. 71 The Supreme Court granted certi-
orari and considered Sattazahn's claims of Double Jeopardy and Due
Process.72 The Court held that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
correct in its conclusion that "neither the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause nor the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
barred Pennsylvania from seeking the death penalty against petitioner
on retrial.
73
IV. ARGUMENT
The arguments presented in the remainder of this comment, call-
ing for double jeopardy protection for defendants like David Sat-
tazahn, are divided among the following five sections. The first section
establishes a foundation for the right to those protections by explain-
ing two categories of cases, one of which encompasses situations like
that of David Sattazahn, in which double jeopardy protections are trig-
gered without an acquittal. The rationales for the double jeopardy
clause and its protections are considered in the second section. This is
particularly important as the reasons behind both our laws and consti-
tutional protections are a key element in determining their scope and
application. The third section considers the other side of the coin.
What is the government interest against which to balance the interests
of the accused? Here the interests are different than in a typical double
jeopardy analysis, as the case is in the sentencing phase rather than in
a guilt determining phase. Also coming into play in these circum-
stances are the unique, severe, and final nature of capital sentencing.
The character, effects, and ramifications of the sentence must be con-
sidered when deciding what types of protections should be given to the
death penalty, and this is explored in the fourth section of the argu-
ment. Finally, the consequences of this particular decision are consid-
ered in the fifth and final section of the argument.
The Decisive Factor: Is Acquittal Required for Double Jeopardy
Protection?
The key issue that divided the majority and dissent in Sattazahn
was whether an acquittal was required to trigger double jeopardy pro-
tections.7 4 The majority rested its argument on precedent as described
above, most notably citing Bullington and Rumsey.7" Justice Scalia
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 116.
74. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. 101.
75. Id.; see also Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203; Bullington, 451 U.S. 430.
[Vol. 27:117
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reminded the Court that these cases held "that an 'acquittal' at a trial-
like sentencing phase, rather than the mere imposition of a life sen-
tence, is required to give rise to double-jeopardy protections. '76 He
also reiterated "that the relevant inquiry for double-jeopardy purposes
was not whether the defendant received a life sentence the first time
around, but rather whether a first life sentence was an 'acquittal' based
on findings sufficient to establish legal entitlement to the life sen-
tence.77 In other words, in order for double jeopardy to attach, it was
necessary that there be "findings that the government failed to prove
one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
78
In the end, the majority held that Sattazahn was never "acquitted"
of the death penalty and therefore was not entitled to double-jeopardy
protection.79 As Justice O'Connor stated in her concurrence, "When,
as in this case, the jury deadlocks in the penalty phase of a capital
trial, it does not 'decide' that the prosecution has failed to prove its
case for the death penalty."" ° Even the dissent admitted that the fact
that Sattazahn was not "acquitted" of the death penalty constituted an
"undebatable point" in the analysis of the case. 8
The dissent, however, went on to argue that acquittal is not neces-
sary to trigger double jeopardy protection. 2 In making this argument,
Justice Ginsburg relied on United States v. Scott, which acknowledged
that "this Court has also developed a body of law guarding the sepa-
rate but related interest of a defendant in avoiding multiple prosecu-
tions even where no final determination of guilt or innocence has been
made."8 3
United States v. Scott outlined two categories of cases in which
double-jeopardy protection can be triggered without an acquittal.8 4
The first category includes cases where the trial judge declares a mis-
trial.8  This situation "all but invariably contemplates that the prosecu-
tor will be permitted to proceed anew notwithstanding the defendant's
plea of double jeopardy. 8s 6 The Court, however, has traditionally
weighed the contrary interests of the defendant in having his trial com-
76. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. 107.
77. Id. at 108.
78. Id. at 108.
79. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. 101.
80. Id. at 117.
81. Id. at 119.
82. Id. at 120.
83. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 92 (1978).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
20041
9
Todd: Double Jeopardy and the Death Penalty: A Fundamental Constitution
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2004
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
pleted by the tribunal and of society in insuring that justice is doled
out to offenders.8 7 The second of those categories involves "termina-
tion of a trial in defendant's favor before any determination of factual
guilt or innocence."88 In this situation, unlike the typical mistrial,
granting such a motion "obviously contemplates that the proceedings
will terminate then and there in favor of the defendant."8 9
Sattazahn, as the dissent argued, falls into the second category, as
it involved a termination of the proceeding in his favor before any
determination of guilt or innocence.90 In Sattazahn, the jury dead-
locked and no mistrial was declared.91 In fact, "Pennsylvania law pro-
vided that the trial proceedings would terminate 'then and there' in
Sattazahn's favor."92 Pennsylvania law actually required that the judge
conclude the proceedings by entering a life sentence.93
Although it pointedly identified these two categories of double
jeopardy protections, the dissent in Sattazahn did concede two facts.9 4
One is that "double jeopardy law with respect to Scott's second cate-
gory is relatively undeveloped." 95 The other is that Scott "did not hone
in on a case like Sattazahn's."96 The dissent did, however, make sev-
eral important points that indicate that double jeopardy protections
should be triggered in the case of David Sattazahn.97 First of all, Jus-
tice Ginsburg explained how "the Court's reasoning" in Scott gives
"credence to the view that a trial-terminating judgment for life, not
prompted by a procedural move on the defendant's part, creates a legal
entitlement protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause."98 More impor-
tantly, Scott "recognized that defendants have a double jeopardy inter-
est in avoiding multiple prosecutions even when there has been no
determination of guilt or innocence, and that this interest is implicated
by preverdict judgments terminating trials."99
This concept explained by Justice Ginsburg in the Sattazahn dis-
sent is not novel or innovative. As is explained in Crist v. Bretz, "It
87. Id.
88. Id. at 94.
89. Id. at 94.
90. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 122.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 123.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Scott, 437 U.S. at 92.
126 [Vol. 27:117
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became firmly established by the end of the 19th century that a defen-
dant could be put in jeopardy even in a prosecution that did not
culminate in a conviction or an acquittal, and this concept has been
long established as an integral part of double jeopardy jurispru-
dence."' 00 There are many concerns, including "the finality of judg-
ments, the minimization of harassing exposure to the harrowing
experience of a criminal trial, and the valued right to continue with the
chosen jury,"10' which necessitate double jeopardy protection in a
variety of situations. As Justice Ginsburg states in the Sattazahn dis-
sent, "the interest in avoiding a renewed prosecution following a final
judgment is surely engaged here."10 2
Rationales for the Double Jeopardy Clause: Why Protection is Necessary
Without Acquittal
The many rationales given for the Double Jeopardy Clause sup-
port the argument that its protections are necessary in situations that
do not end with an acquittal. Green v. United States stated, "The con-
stitutional prohibition against 'double jeopardy' was designed to pro-
tect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of trial and
possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.'"103
Included in these hazards are the possibility that the all-powerful state
will repeatedly try a defendant for the same crime,' 04 the expense and
embarrassment that such an ordeal will cost a defendant, 10 5 the con-
tinued state of insecurity and anxiety in which a defendant is forced to
live, 10 6 the possibility that although innocent, he may eventually be
found guilty, 10 7 and the right of an accused to have his trial completed
by a particular tribunal.' 06 Risks such as these occur in a variety of
situations that do not involve an acquittal, as "the heavy personal
strain of the second trial is the same in either case," as is "the risk that,
though innocent, the defendant may be found guilty at a second
trial."' 0 9
100. Crist, 437 U.S. at 34.
101. Id. at 38.
102. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 123-124.
103. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
104. Scott, 437 U.S. at 96.
105. Green, 355 U.S. at 187. See also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 503-504
(1978).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Washington, 434 U.S. at 503.
109. Scott, 437 U.S. at 108.
20041
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A famous quote from Green, which was used in many cases to
follow, starts, "The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at
least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State
with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense."'1 1
This proposal warns against the "all-powerful state relentlessly pursu-
ing a defendant""' through multiple trials for the same crime. An
important distinction, however, is made between defendants when
considering whether this rationale is applicable and protection should
be given.
First there is the defendant who has "either been found not guilty"
or "had at least insisted on having the issue of guilt submitted to the
first trier of fact."'112 Second, there is the defendant who "chooses to
avoid conviction and imprisonment, not because of his assertion that
the Government has failed to make out a case against him, but because
of a legal claim that the Government's case against him must fail even
though it might satisfy the trier of fact that he was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt."'1 13 Defendants who fit into the second category do
not require or deserve protection from the all-powerful State, whereas
those in the first category do require and deserve such protection.
Defendants like Sattazahn fall into the first category of defend-
ants. Sattazahn, and any future defendants in similar positions, have
insisted on having the issue of guilt or innocence submitted to the trier
of fact, yet pursuant to state statutes are forced to accept a life sentence
when a decision cannot be reached. As the dissent stated:
Unlike Scott, Sattazahn did not successfully avoid having the
question of guilt or innocence submitted to the first jury. The 'issue of
guilt' in his case indeed was 'submitted to the first trier of fact.' Sat-
tazahn was thus 'forced to run the gauntlet once' on death. Nor did
Sattazahn himself bring about termination of his first trial. Once thejury deadlocked, state law directly mandated that the trial end. In
short, the reasons we thought double jeopardy protection did not
attach in Scott are absent here." 4
In other words, Sattazahn did not attempt to avoid a decision on
guilt or innocence, but sent that question to the jury, and was then
required to accept a life sentence by virtue of the statute. Since he did
not choose to avoid conviction based on a legal claim outside of the
110. Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
111. Scott, 437 U.S. at 96.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 125-126. (citations omitted)
128 [Vol. 27:117
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question of guilt or innocence, but insisted on having the jury decide
that question, he is entitled to the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
The oft-quoted Green decision went on to express another con-
cern which the Double Jeopardy Clause is intended to protect against
when it said, ". . .thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense,
and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity."' 1 5 This rationale is also discussed in Arizona v. Wash-
ington, which focused on the increased "financial and emotional bur-
den on the accused" and the prolonged "period in which he is
stigmatized by an unresolved accusation of wrongdoing.' 16 This is
perhaps the clearest, most basic reason for holding that a defendant is
put in jeopardy regardless of the fact that his trial is suspended with-
out a verdict.'
17
Who can deny that a man, having experienced a trial for murder,
with the possibility of death looming over him, hasn't been through
embarrassment, anxiety, and insecurity? Who can deny the financial
expense and emotional burdens a man, on trial for his life, has under-
gone? Who can deny the stigma that a charge of murder, be he inno-
cent or guilty, leaves on a person's life? More importantly, having been
spared his life, who can expect a man to suffer through all of this
again? Common sense tells us that all of these perils which double
jeopardy is meant to protect against are "plainly implicated by the pros-
pect of a second capital sentencing proceeding."" 8
The last concern expressed in the renowned Green quote was
... the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty." 19 Arizona v. Washington also articulated concern for the pos-
sibility that the second trial "may even enhance the risk that an inno-
cent defendant may be convicted."'120 This rationale is implicated in a
slightly different manner when the issue is sentencing, but is still rele-
vant and important. When it comes to the death penalty, the issue
becomes whether the second trial risks putting to death a man who
does not deserve it, be it because he is truly innocent or because his
crime does not meet the requisites for capital punishment. Although
different in result, the risk encountered remains the same and equally
dangerous.
115. Green, 355 U.S. at 187.
116. Washington, 434 U.S. at 503-504.
117. Crist, 437 U.S. at 35.
118. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 124.
119. Green, 355 U.S. at 188.
120. Washington, 434 U.S. at 504.
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Finally, Arizona v. Washington discussed an additional rationale
when it stated the constitutional protection of double jeopardy
"embraces the defendant's 'valued right to have his trial completed by a
particular tribunal'." '' The reason this right is entitled to constitu-
tional protection is because "even if the first trial is not completed, a
second prosecution may be grossly unfair."'1 2 2 Again, though slightly
different due to the intricacies and consequences of sentencing, the
risk of unfairness is equally hazardous and must be considered in
determining whether double jeopardy attaches.
All of these cases identify a variety of reasons, including money,
psychology, reputation, and simple considerations of fairness and the
right to be free from an all-powerful State, which justify the existence
of double jeopardy protections. All of these concerns, be they the right
to have a trial completed by a particular group of jurors, or the
increased chance that an innocent man will be found guilty, are impli-
cated by a second trial, regardless of whether a verdict of acquittal is
handed down in the first. The consequences of a second trial on any
question of the guilt of a criminal defendant do not depend solely on
the outcome of the first.
Balancing the Rationales for Protection with Society's Interest in
Killing?
When considering the rationales given for the Double Jeopardy
Clause and its protections, courts balance those rationales with the
interests of the state. In cases deciding whether double jeopardy
should prevent a second trial on guilt or innocence, the state is con-
cerned with furthering society's interest in "giving the prosecution one
complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws."1 23
In other words, it is important for the state to have one comprehensive
chance to determine the guilt or innocence of each criminal defendant,
and to make sure the correct person is put in prison and punished for
his crime.
However, when the issue involves sentencing, most notably the
choice between life in prison and the death penalty, the interests of
both the state and society change. At this stage, the prosecution has
had a complete opportunity to convict the defendant, the defendant
has been found guilty of violating the laws of the state, and the defen-
dant is assured to spend a great deal of time paying for his crime. The
121. Id. at 503. (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 509.
130 [Vol. 27:117
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state is not, and can no longer be, concerned with whether it has
received a fair shot at trying and convicting those who violate its laws.
Therefore, the interests of both the state and its people shift to the
consequences of either putting the guilty man to death for his crime,
or putting him away for the rest of his life. The question then
becomes: Is this a valuable interest with which society should be con-
cerned? Or should the state and its people be content with putting a
decidedly guilty man in prison for what will probably be the rest of his
natural life? In answering this question, it is important to consider
both the nature and consequences of capital sentencing and the many
issues that arise when discussing the death penalty.
First of all, it is often asked whether the death penalty is really
worth its exorbitant cost. According to the Death Penalty Information
Center, "Death penalty cases are much more expensive than other
criminal cases and cost more than imprisonment for life with no possi-
bility of parole."' 24 Why are we paying the inflated price of killing
men for murder when it's less expensive to try them and house them
for life? More importantly, why should we shoulder these financial
burdens twice for the same defendant?
The only seemingly logical justification for the added expense of
capital sentencing is that the death penalty is more effective in produc-
ing positive societal results than life imprisonment. Most of our soci-
ety would be quite willing to pay more in taxes to execute convicted
murderers if they knew it worked to deter prospective criminals and
prevent further crimes from ever occurring. Shouldering the burden
upfront would save everyone money in the long run, as it would cut
costs related to both the violence of crime and prosecuting future
criminals. However, as the next consideration shows us, this seem-
ingly logical presumption is simply not the case.
Many scholars and laymen alike often debate whether the death
penalty actually achieves its goal of deterrence and prevention of
future crime. The Death Penalty Information Center reports the views
of an overwhelming number of criminologists who believe that
"research fails to support a deterrence justification for the death pen-
alty."'125 Some reports state that executions may actually increase the
124. Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About the High
Costs of the Death Penalty (1994), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?
scid=45&did=385.
125. M. Radelet and R. Akers, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the
Experts (1995), at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=12&did = 167#
STUDIES.
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number of murders rather than deter murders. 126 Rationally, it seems
that if the death penalty were achieving any goal at all it would be
deterrence of future crimes. However, it appears that it is not even
successfully reaching this objective. Why do we as a society press so
vigorously for a system that is not even accomplishing its most basic,
fundamental goals? Even more interestingly, why would we push for
this practice multiple times with a single criminal defendant?
In addition, the question is often raised whether the death penalty
is issued equally among different races and social classes. Studies
show shocking evidence of discrimination both regarding the race of
the defendant and the race of the victim in death penalty cases. 1 2 7 The
most dangerous combination for a death penalty case is a black defen-
dant with a non-black victim. 128 Also important in capital sentencing
cases is attorney representation. Those in lower social classes simply
cannot afford the type of lawyers they need to save themselves from
what could be a death sentence. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg stated it
best when she said "People who are well represented at trial do not get
the death penalty... I have yet to see a death case among the dozens
coming to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in
which the defendant was well represented at trial.' 1 29
Finally, and of course the most important concern of all, is the
number of innocent men and women we as a country are putting to
death each year. Since 1973, 115 innocent people have been exoner-
ated from death row. The latest man to be exonerated from death row
was Ryan Matthews who was cleared by the help of DNA evidence on
August 9, 2004.130 In addition to those exonerated, 227 inmates have
been granted clemency since 1976, for reasons varying from doubts
about the defendant's guilt to governors' conclusions about the death
penalty process.' 3 ' This means that a total of 342 individuals have
been taken off death row in the last 30 years for one reason or another.
126. Professor Ernie Thompson, Homicide Studies, Vol. 1, No.2 (May 1997), available
at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=12&did=167#STUDIES.
127. Richard C. Dieter, The Death Penalty in Black and White: Who Lives, Who Dies,
Who Decides (1998), available at http://www.deathpenahyinfo.org/article.php?scid=
4 5 &did=5 3 9#National%20Patterns%20of% 2ORace%2ODiscriminationn.
128. Id.
129. Associated Press (April 10, 2001), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?did=896&scid=68.
130. Death Penalty Information Center, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?scid=6&did=1 10.
131. Death Penalty Information Center, available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.
org/article.php?did=126&scid= 13.
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Of course, in analyzing double jeopardy as it relates to sentencing,
those who will be affected by the protections, or lack thereof, have
been found guilty, had their convictions overturned, and then found
guilty a second time. It must be conceded that the chance of these
individuals actually being innocent remains somewhat diminutive.
The reality, however, is that we simply do not know. Is it not better to
put ten guilty men in prison for the rest of their lives than to put one
innocent man to death? The alternative is not to let these men and
women go free, to allow them to get away with murder. These defend-
ants have already been found guilty, whether they truly committed the
crime or not. In these cases we are simply talking about sparing these
defendants their lives, the majority of which will still be spent in
prison.
Considering the numerous concerns with the practice of capital
sentencing, we must pause at the notion of prosecuting someone not
once, but twice, for this problematic sentence. Does the scale really tip
in favor of society's interest in killing over the justifications for double
jeopardy protection? Or should we give death penalty candidates a
break after the first trial determines their sentence to be life? When
considering such a final sentence as death, it seems it is better to err
on the side of caution, and choose life.
The Death Penalty: A Unique and Final Punishment Deserving of
Special Consideration
No one can deny that the death penalty is a sentence "unique in
both its severity and its finality.' 1 32 As our cases have recognized,
"... the penalty of death is different in kind from any other punish-
ment imposed under our system of criminal justice.' 1 33 Yet all too
often this vital fact is forgotten, and capital sentencing is not given the
special consideration it deserves and needs.
The death penalty is the most controversial sentence in our crimi-
nal justice system. As the one sentence that many claim a moral, relig-
ious, or ethical opposition to, the death penalty stirs arguments and
debates between many individuals and groups. Even those who do not
claim any clear opposition to the death penalty question whether it can
be or is applied equally and effectively among our criminal defendants.
Differences in opinion over this divisive topic draw lines within politi-
cal parties, attorneys, and even families.
132. Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998).
133. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
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No matter where an individual falls in the many disagreements
surrounding the death penalty, its severity and finality are not debata-
ble. No matter where one comes down on the question of whether
capital sentencing should be used in our American system of criminal
justice, no matter what one thinks about the sentence's application, the
importance of this practice and its effect on people's lives is
unquestioned.
Death is the most severe and final punishment one can receive.
Questions of whether a criminal defendant truly committed the crime
for which they are convicted may always loom, but once he has been
executed, the answers no longer matter. Prison terms, by contrast, can
be shortened, lengthened, or even brought to an end. When DNA or
newly discovered evidence exonerates someone, they can be released
from prison. Although they may have missed out on many years of
their lives, they will have some time left to enjoy. Executions, however,
take a matter of minutes and end the life of the defendant forever.
Executions affect family members, friends, and society as a whole.
Obviously less important than the execution of innocent people,
but still of grave concern, is the amount of stress and emotion that
someone on trial for their life must go through, and the heartache that
their families also face. The mental and emotional burden, which any
defendant who is subject to possible execution must endure, is simply
unimaginable. Living your life on a daily basis, for months and some-
times even years, wondering if your time will soon come to an end has
to be incredibly trying. Living your life knowing that your fate is in the
hands of twelve strangers has to put you on edge every second of every
day.
In addition to the defendant on trial, there are mothers, fathers,
sisters, brothers, spouses, children, aunts, uncles, grandparents, and
close friends who not only watch their loved one go through this expe-
rience, but have their own reactions and feelings as well. Their emo-
tions, though perhaps not as stinging and burdensome as the
individual actually on trial for his or her life, are also difficult and
complicated and must be of some concern.
As the dissenting opinion in Sattazahn argued, "These qualities
heighten Sattazahn's double jeopardy interest in avoiding a second
prosecution.' 1 34 All of the concerns and rationales behind the Double
Jeopardy Clause are exacerbated when the result is death. All the
"hazards" of a second trial, including the emotional and financial bur-
dens, are aggravated when the result is not freedom or imprisonment,
134. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 127.
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but imprisonment or death. Also, the possibility of error becomes
much more serious and the results much more grave. The conse-
quences of error involve putting an innocent man to death rather than
simply in prison. Finally, as Justice Ginsburg stated, "Death... makes
the 'dilemma' a defendant faces when she decides whether to appeal all
the more 'incredible'.' 1 35 The defendant is forced to take a gamble
with his life to ensure his right to a fair trial. Death is "indeed a pen-
alty 'different' from all others"' 36 and is therefore deserving of more
heightened consideration when discussing double jeopardy.
Consequences: The Choice Between the Right to Appeal or Entitlement
to Life
The argument has been made, and successfully so, that when a
defendant has a conviction overturned by his own appeal he can be
tried again on the ground that he has "waived his plea of former jeop-
ardy by asking that the conviction be set aside."' 37 The Government
made this argument in Green, stating that Green ". . .waived his consti-
tutional defense of former jeopardy.. .by making a successful appeal of
his improper conviction."'138 However, the Court in Green rejected this
argument for precisely the same reason why it should be rejected here
in the discussion of the death penalty.
Justice Black reminded us in Green that waiver, although "vague,"
and "used for a great variety of purposes, good and bad... connotes
some kind of voluntary knowing relinquishment of a right."'139 Green,
however, had "no meaningful choice," and therefore could not have
possibly "voluntarily" given up his rights. 140 As Justice Holmes stated
in Kepner v. United States:
Usually no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it
cannot be imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the correc-
tion of a fatal error, unless he should waive other rights so important
as to be saved by an express clause in the Constitution of the United
States.' 4 '
Although somewhat different, a similar dilemma exists in a case
such as Sattazahn. For someone like Sattazahn, the question becomes
whether he has waived his "state-granted entitlement to avoid the death
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Green, 355 U.S. at 189.
138. Id. at 191.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 192.
141. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 135 (1904).
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penalty," 142 as opposed to waiving a constitutional protection. Never-
theless, as the dissent argued, ". . .the considerations advanced in
Green should inform our decision here." 14 3 As Justice Ginsburg
explained,
Under the Court's decision, if a defendant sentenced to life after a
jury deadlock chooses to appeal her underlying conviction, she faces
the possibility of death if she is successful on appeal but convicted on
retrial. If, on the other hand, the defendant loses her appeal, or
chooses to forgo an appeal, the final judgment for life stands.144
The consequences of this "choice" are immense, far-reaching, and
simply unacceptable. The American criminal justice system prides
itself on giving every defendant a speedy trial before a jury of his peers
that is both fair and just in determining his guilt or innocence, as well
as his sentence. These ideals have been outlined in the Constitutions
of our country and states, as well as many statutes and rules that gov-
ern the procedure and content of all trials in our criminal justice sys-
tem. While it is impossible to avoid every mistake, be it in the
evidence allowed, the procedure followed, or the instructions given, the
one thing that can be done to eradicate as many problems as possible
is to allow the defendant to appeal those errors.
When a defendant is put in the position where he must choose
between this highly valued right to an appeal and his right to life, a
very disturbing situation emerges. There will be those defendants who
are willing to accept the mistakes, give in to the misconduct of prosecu-
tors, judges, and juries, just to protect themselves from execution. Yet
there will also be those defendants who choose to fight those errors,
and pay for it with their lives. Regardless of which direction the indi-
vidual goes the reality is that the defendant is faced with a situation in
which there really is no choice at all, at least not a meaningful one.
As the dissent stated in Sattazahn, "we have previously declined to
interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause in a manner that puts defendants
in this bind."14 5 It is difficult to swallow the argument that asks us to
begin to change this precedent in a situation involving the death pen-
alty. If there ever is, or has been, a situation in which we should err on
the side of caution, it is in the area of capital sentencing. Even if the
result is that in some situations it gives the defendant more choice than
we might like, even if the result opens the system to some occasional
142. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126.
143. Id. at 127.
144. Id. at 126.
145. Id. at 127.
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abuse, we have protected the rights to appeal, and the rights to life for
many more individuals who needed it.
V. CONCLUSION
The rationales behind the double jeopardy clause, encompassing
everything from protection from the state to the mental, emotional,
and financial burdens of a second trial, call for its protections in a
wide variety of situations. The protections of double jeopardy do not
stop simply at the defendant who has been acquitted by the sole deci-
sionmaker on the issue of guilt or innocence. The defendant who has
endured a trial on the issue of death, and had the proceedings termi-
nated with a decision in his favor is also deserving of these protec-
tions. More importantly, when balanced against the interests of the
state in executing a man for his crime, the interests in protecting this
defendant become clear.
Not only do the rationales behind the implementation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause support its protections in this context, but the
nature and character of the death penalty also call for special consider-
ations in making this monumental decision. It cannot be ignored that
the death penalty is the most unique, controversial, severe, and final
punishment ever to be implemented, handed down, and practiced in
the history of our country. The execution of a criminal defendant can-
not be taken back, and the process in which it is decided cannot be
done in a fair and just manner. If there is ever a time to err on the side
of caution and carefulness, it is in the area of capital sentencing.
Finally, the consequences of denying individuals in this situation
double jeopardy protections are simply too disastrous to ignore. Plac-
ing an individual in the position of choosing between a fair trial and
his life is a violation of all of our most basic American ideals regarding
the criminal justice system. The ramifications of this "choice" not only
affect the defendant himself, but all the players in our adversary
system.
For all the reasons outlined in this comment, defendants like
David Sattazahn deserve the protections of the Double Jeopardy
Clause; the protections that are guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States of America. Without protections for these individuals,
the various principles behind the Double Jeopardy Clause are defeated,
capital sentencing is denied the extraordinary deliberation it deserves,
and the rights to both a fair trial and an appeal are destroyed.
Kristen Lindsay Todd
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